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Abstract. Checking various log files from different processes can be a
tedious task as these logs contain lots of events, each with a (possibly
large) number of attributes. We developed a way to automatically model
log files with a dozen attributes and detect outlier traces in the data.
For that we extend Dynamic Bayesian Networks to model the normal
behavior found in log files. We introduce a new algorithm that is able
to learn a model of a log file starting from the data itself. The model is
capable of scoring traces even when new values or new combinations of
values appear in the log file and has the ability to give a decomposition
of the score indicating the root cause for the anomalies.
1 Introduction
We propose a way of detecting anomalous behavior in Business Processes (BPs).
A BP is a series of structured activities in order to perform a task [1]. Such a
sequence of events that together form an instantiation of a BP is called a trace
of the business process. In order to monitor a BP, activities are logged in a log
file. This file consists of different events and every line in the log file represents
a single event. Often log files already indicate which events belong together in
the same trace. If not we can apply a clustering algorithm as described in [2] for
identifying the different traces.
Example 1. The log file in Table 1 is generated by a Business Process where an
employee needs to log into a system to create a request. This request is then sent
to his or her manager who can approve or reject the request. The log consists of
7 attributes: Time, EventID, Type, Activity, UserID, UserName and UserRole.
We also keep track of the trace to which an event belongs. In total we have 4
users, each with a unique ID and Name. Every user has a role from a limited set
of roles. For the sake of simplicity we have only captured a subset of all possible
actions that can occur.
In the context of Business Processes, the detection of anomalous behavior is
an important problem. Therefor, in this paper we describe an anomaly detection
system that can find deviating traces. This is done by learning the structure and
parameters of a model that reflects the normal behavior of a system. Our model
takes all attributes and relations between attributes into account, in contrast
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Time ID Type Activity UserID UserName UserRole tID
0 0 User-Actions Log in 001 User1 employee 1
1 1 User-Actions Logged in 001 User1 employee 1
1 2 Request Permission Create Request 001 User1 employee 1
2 3 Request Permission Send Mail 001 User1 employee 1
3 4 User-Actions Log in 001 User1 employee 2
4 5 User-Actions Logged in 001 User1 employee 2
6 6 Request Permission Create Request 001 User1 employee 2
7 7 Request Permission Send Mail 001 User1 employee 2
8 8 Request Permission Disapproved 002 User2 manager 2
9 9 User-Actions Log in 003 User3 employee 3
10 10 User-Actions Logged in 003 User3 employee 3
10 11 Request Permission Create Request 003 User3 employee 3
11 12 Request Permission Approved 002 User2 manager 1
12 13 Request Permission Send Mail 003 User3 employee 3
17 14 Request Permission Approved 004 User4 sales-manager 3
18 12 User-Actions Log in 001 User1 manager 4
19 13 User-Actions Logged in 001 User1 manager 4
20 14 Request Permission Create Request 001 User1 manager 4
21 15 Request Permission Approved 001 User1 manager 4
21 16 Request Permission Send Mail 001 User1 manager 4
Table 1: Example Log file containing normal (black) and anomalous (red) traces
to existing techniques [3]. Which provides us with a lot more useful informa-
tion since log files created by an autonomous system often consist of many more
attributes. Attributes can influence each other within an event and between dif-
ferent events. Besides missing activities or a wrong ordering of activities there
can be constraints on the activities enforcing that two activities must be per-
formed by the same person or that a person needs to have a certain role to
perform an action.
Diagrams like BPMN models are a great tool for human understanding of
a Business Process. For applications such as anomaly detection, BPMN models
are, however, insufficiently powerful as they lack the ability to easily express
joint probability distributions and multiple attributes; they focus on a single
perspective (i.e. the resource-activity perspective). Therefore, in order to take
advantage of all possible relations between attributes in a log file we create a
model based on Dynamic Bayesian Networks (DBNs) [4]. DBNs are an extension
of Bayesian Networks that are able to incorporate discrete time. This model will
link current events to their predecessors in order to find relations between these
events rather than only relations within one event.
In this paper we identify and improve two large shortcomings of DBNs when
it comes to modeling the allowable sequences in a log:
– DBNs are not able to handle unseen values in an appropriate way for business
process logs.
– The case where a value always occurs together with another value describes
a common structure in log files. We can model these relations in a DBN but
only implicit which may lead to less effective structures.
Therefor we extended the formalism of Dynamic Bayesian Networks to incorpo-
rate the aspects that are typical for log files. We will show that our extended
Dynamic Bayesian Networks perform well for detecting anomalies.
The structure of our paper is as follows. Section 2 describes existing ap-
proaches to this (or similar) problems. Section 3 introduces the model for de-
scribing normal behavior in log files. We then use this model in Section 3.4 in
order to discover anomalies in traces of events found in log files. The construc-
tion of the model is described in Section 4. We will evaluate our new method in
Section 5.
2 Related Work
The problem we are interested in is that of finding anomalous sequences (traces)
within a large database of discrete multivariate sequences. Different techniques
have been proposed to solve this problem both in the anomaly detection field
[5,6,7,8], as in the process mining field [9,10]. Some of these techniques use sig-
natures of known anomalies that can occur in the system. It is clear that these
systems cannot recognize a new type of anomaly and are too limited for our
purpose. We are interested in techniques that build a model, such as Markov
Chains that represent normal behavior of a system.
A first type of algorithms works on a database of univariate sequences; i.e.,
they only take the activity into account. Bezerra et al. [9] investigated the de-
tection of anomalies in a log file using existing Process Mining algorithms in
order to build a model of the process. This model is then used to detect anoma-
lous executions of this process. They only use information about the activities
performed so they can use standard Process Mining techniques which do not
take the extra attributes into account. Nolle et al. [6] propose an unsupervised
anomaly detection method based on neural networks in noisy business process
event logs. Using these neural networks makes it possible to reduce the impact
of noise in the dataset, where other methods need a training dataset without
anomalies as a reference. They do this by adding extra noise to the data before
feeding the data into the neural network. Next the neural network is trained
to reproduce its input. After the training phase, the network can be used to
reproduce the traces from the same input log without the noise. Normal traces
are expected to be reproduced with less errors than anomalous traces.
Other algorithms work on databases of multivariate sequences. Bertens [7]
uses MDL to identify multivariate patterns that helps him detect and describe
anomalies. A code table consisting of mappings between encodings and fre-
quently occurring patterns is first generated by their algorithm called DITTO
[11]. The anomaly score is defined by dividing the length of the encoded sequence
given the code table on the whole dataset by the length of the sequence. Bohmer
et al. [10] introduce a probabilistic model that is able to score events in the data.
First a Basic Likelihood Graph is constructed where all activities are nodes and
the edges between nodes indicate the probability that given the previous activ-
ity, a certain activity happens next. In the next phase this graph is extended
by adding a resource and weekday between two activities that correspond to
the resource that performed the previous action on a particular weekday. Using
this graph it is possible to compute a baseline-score given the occurrence of a
Univariate Multivariate Method
Our method X Dynamic Bayesian Network
Ye [8] X Markov Chains
Bezerra [9] X Process Mining
Nolle [6] X Neural Networks
Bertens [7] X Minimum Description Length
Bohmer [10] X Probabilistic Model
Table 2: Summary of Related Work in comparison with our proposed method
particular activity. This baseline-score is compared with the actual score given
to an execution trace by the model. To score an actual trace Bohmer et al. use
the data in the graph with the corresponding probabilities to get a score for
the entire trace. Besides data present in the graph, the model is also able to
deal with new values. However, they do not describe and test the use of more
attributes in detail, but their model can be extended in a straightforward way
to other attributes as well. A summary of the different techniques can be found
in Table 2.
On the topic of handling unseen values Milch et al. [12] proposed BLOG, a
language to model the generation of a possible world of values. However a well
formed language, it still lack some functionality we would like to add to the
Dynamic Bayesian Networks.
3 Extended Dynamic Bayesian Networks
In this section we extend Dynamic Bayesian Networks to create a model which is
more flexible and powerful when dealing with log files. Therefor we first formally
define a log file.
Definition 1. We assume that A = {A1, . . . , An}, an ordered set of attributes,
is given. For each attribute Ai a set of allowed values dom(Ai) is also given.
An event is a pair (ID , desc) with ID a identifier and desc an event descrip-
tion. An event description is a tuple (a1, . . . , an) with ai ∈ dom(Ai); desc.Ai
denotes ai. We use e.Ai as a shorthand notation for e.desc.Ai.
A trace T = 〈e1, . . . , ei〉 is a sequence of events. A log L is a set of traces,
where events in the traces have different identifiers.
3.1 History and Context of an event
To be able to incorporate the timing aspect we introduce the k-history and
k-context of an event.
Definition 2. The k-history of an event ei is defined as Hk(ei) = xk · . . . · x1
where · denotes concatenation and where
xl =
{
ei−l.desc if i− l > 0
(None, . . . , None) otherwise
None is a special dedicated value that should not occur in the log. We use
Hk(ei).Al to denote the value of attribute A from the l-th event before ei in
the trace that is, xl.A.
Definition 3. The k-context of an event e is defined as Ck(e) = (Hk(e) ·e.desc)
we use the notations:
Ck(e).A := e.A
Ck(e).Al := Hk(e).Al
Example 2. For the log in Table 1, the 2-history of the event with ID 3 is the tuple
(User − Actions1, Loggedin1, 0011, User11, employee1, RequestPermission,
CreateRequest, 001, User1, employee). The 2-context of this event is the tuple
(User−Actions2, Loggedin2, 0012, User12, employee2, RequestPermission1,
CreateRequest1, 0011, User11, employee1, RequestPermission, SendMail,
001, User1, employee).
3.2 Conditional Probability Tables and Functional Dependencies
In Dynamic Bayesian Networks, the relations within the model are represented
using Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs).
Definition 4. A CPT (X|Y ) is a table where each row contains the conditional
probability for a value of X given a combination of values of Y .
The following example indicates the problems we have when using only CPTs
for describing BP log files:
Example 3. Consider the situation where every User has a particular Role and
certain activities can only be executed by certain roles. The attribute Role depends
on the User and the Activity in this example. When building a single CPT we
have to add a row for every possible combination of values for User and Activity,
resulting in a large table with a lot of probabilities equal to 1. Also, when a new
user is added to the system, all combinations with this user would have to be
added to the CPT.
To avoid these problems we introduce a new type of relation: a Functional De-
pendency.
Definition 5. Given a log L. A Functional Dependency At1 → Bt2 holds in
L if for all events e, f ∈ L holds that if C(e).At1 = C(f).At1 6= None, then
C(e).Bt2 = C(f).Bt2 for attributes A and B and time steps t1 and t2.
A Functional Dependency (FD) between attributes X and Y can be represented
by a function FDX→Y : a dom(X) → a dom(Y ), FDX→Y (x) = y, with x and
y the respective values for attributes X and Y. a dom(A) is defined as follows:
Definition 6. Let L be a log over A and {Ai1 , . . . , Aik} ⊆ A(L). We define the
active domain a dom(Ai1 , . . . , Aik) = {(e.ai1 , . . . , e.aik)|∀T ∈ L : e ∈ T} as the
set containing all values that occur in the log for the given attributes.
Example 4. In the log in Table 1, UserID → UserRole is a Functional Depen-
dency. Every value of UserID uniquely maps to a value of UserRole. A particular
value in UserRole can however occur together with multiple values in UserID.
We have the following mappings in our log:
{001 7→ employee, 002 7→ manager, 003 7→ employee, 004 7→ sales−manager}
It is possible to mimic this behavior by only using CPTs with all probabili-
ties set to 1. Introducing Functional Dependencies, however, allows us to create
easier models that can be used to express more general patterns. Furthermore
we are able to first check for these FDs, making the search for the Conditional
Dependencies less complex. When using separate FDs we are also able to deter-
mine the exact FD for which we got deviating values, CPTs do not provide us
with the same amount of expressiveness.
A second major shortcoming of CPTs when dealing with log files is that only
values that have occurred in the training dataset will be present in the tables. In
a log file it might be normal for new users to appear without these events being
anomalous. The model will assign a probability of 0 to these values. If the new
value, however, satisfies all other relations then it is likely to be a correct event.
Smoothing could be used, but may be inappropriate for attributes with frequent
new values. The frequency of new values depends on the attribute itself, not on
the log file.
3.3 Extending the Dynamic Bayesian Networks
Combining all these elements, we extend the definition of a DBN as follows:
Definition 7. An extended DBN with memory k over A is a tuple:
(G,FDR, CPT ,FD, new value, new relation, violation) :
– G(V,E) is a directed acyclic graph with V = Ak ∪ . . . ∪ A1 ∪ A where Ai =
{Ai|A ∈ A} for i = 1, . . . , k, and E ⊆ V ×A.
Ai represents the attributes of the ith event before the current event.
E expresses dependencies of the attributes of the current event on the other
attributes in its context.
– FD ⊆ E denotes the set of dependencies that are functional.
– For each variable A ∈ A, Parents(A) denotes the set of variables
{B ∈ V |(B,A) ∈ E \ FD}.
– CPT consists of a Conditional Probability Table CPT (A|Parents(A)) for
each A ∈ A
– FD consists of a Mapping FDA→B for each (A,B) ∈ FD
– new value(A) is a function A → [0, 1] representing the probability of encountering unseen values
– new relation(A) is a function A → [0, 1] representing the probability of encountering an unseen
combination of parent values for the CPT.
– violation(X,Y ) is a function A×A → [0, 1] representing the probability that FDX→Y is broken.
Figure 1 shows a possible eDBN based on our example.
Fig. 1: eDBN with conditional (full) and functional dependencies (dotted)
The joint distribution of an eDBN An eDBN with memory k represents a
joint distribution over sequences as follows:
P (〈e1, . . . , em〉) =
∏
e∈〈e1,...,em〉
P (e|Hk(e)) (1)
=
∏
e∈〈e1,...,em〉
∏
A∈A
P (e.A| Ck(e)|Parents(A)) (2)
The probability for an attribute in an event consists of three different parts.
The first part checks for new values and is defined as:
valueA(x) =
{
1− new value(A) if x ∈ a dom(A)
new value(A) otherwise
(3)
The probability for the Conditional Dependency is given as follows:
Relation(xi|Parents(Xi)) =

new relation(Parents(Xi) if new combination of parent values.
(1− new relation(Parents(Xi))∗
CPT (xi|Parents(Xi)) otherwise
(4)
The probability for a Functional Dependency is expressed as follows:
FDMX,Y (y|x) =
{
1− violation(X,Y ) if FDX→Y (x) = y or x 6∈ a dom(X)
violation(X,Y ) otherwise
(5)
To incorporate all the new elements we introduced in our model we extend
the way of determining the probability in contrast to original BNs.
P (e.A| Ck(e)|Parents(A)) = valueA(e.A)·Relation(e.A|Parents(A))
·
∏
(X,A)∈FDR
FDMX→A(e.A|Ck(e).X))
Example 5. The probability for an event e in the model given in Figure 1 is equal
to:
value(Activity1)Relation(Activity1|Activity0)value(Type1)
· FDM(Type1|Activity0)FDM(Type1|Activity1)FDM(Type1|Type0)
· value(UserID1)FDM(UserID1|UserName1)value(UserName1)
· FDM(UserName1|UserID1)value(UserRole1)Relation(UserRole1|Activity1)
· FDM(UserRole1|UserID1)FDM(UserRole1|UserName1)
The value for the attribute UserRole1 for the event with ID 2 is:
value(UserRole1)Relation(UserRole1|Activity1)
∗ FDM(UserRole1|UserID1)FDM(UserRole1|UserName1)
= (1− 0.2) ∗ (1− 0.4) ∗ 1 ∗ (1− 0) ∗ (1− 0) = 0.48
This score can be decomposed to find the root cause for any anomaly in the
data. This will be further elaborated in future work.
3.4 Anomaly detection
To find anomalous sequences of events we use a score-based approach. The score
is obtained by calculating the probability for a trace 〈e1, . . . , en〉 given a model
m. We normalize the result using the n-th root, with n the number of events in
the trace. This normalization makes sure that longer traces are not penalized.
Score(〈e1, . . . , en〉) = n
√
P (〈e1, . . . , en〉) (6)
Sequences with a high score thus have a high probability of occurring and are
most likely to represent normal behavior, whereas low scores indicate higher
chances of being an anomaly. We return a sorted list of traces, sorted by their
scores. The idea is that a user can only handle the first k anomalies detected.
Since we can score any sequence of events, we do not have to wait for a complete
trace before we can score it. The model can thus be used to detect anomalies in
ongoing traces.
4 Learning the structure and parameters of the model
We build our model using a reference dataset containing only the normal execu-
tion of the process. Our experiments show that the performance of our algorithm
is, however, not influenced when the dataset contains a small amount of noise.
In order to incorporate the timing aspect we replace every event in the log with
its k-context. We refer to this log as the k-context log.
We can use the k-context log as input for traditional Bayesian Network learn-
ing algorithms that have no specific knowledge about the different time steps to
find the conditional probability tables. Afterwards we interpret the different at-
tributes in their appropriate time slice. The complete algorithm for computing
the structure can be found in Algorithm 12.
1 Function LearnEDBN
Data: variables, FDThreshold
Result: The learned eDBN
2 V = vars
3 FD = {X → Y : X,Y ∈ V | U(X|Y ) > FDThreshold}
4 blacklist = {X → Y : ∀X ∈ Vi, Y ∈ Vj with i ≥ j > 0}
5 whitelist = FD
6 G(V, E) = LearnBayesianNetwork(variables = V, blacklist, whitelist)
7 FDS = ConstructFunctionalDependencyFunctions(FD)
8 CPT = ConstructConditionalProbabilitiesTables(E \ FD)
9 NV = {X 7→ |a dom(X)|| L | : ∀X ∈ V }
10 NR = {X 7→ |a dom(Parents(X))|| L | : ∀X ∈ V }
11 VIOL = {X × Y 7→ |{e∈L:FDX→Y (e.X)6=e.Y }||L| : ∀(X,Y ) ∈ FD}
12 return eDBN(G(V, E \ FD), FD, CPT, FDS, NV, NR, VIOL)
Algorithm 1: Algorithm for learning the structure and parameters of eDBNs
First the algorithm searches for Functional Dependencies in the data. In order
to discover them, the Uncertainty Coefficient [13] is applied to the k-context log,
which is defined as follows for the random variables X and Y :
U(X|Y ) = I(X;Y )
H(X)
,
with H(X) the entropy [14] of X and I(X;Y) the Mutual Information [15] given
as:
I(X;Y ) =
∑
y∈a dom(Y )
∑
x∈a dom(X)
p(x, y) log
p(x, y)
p(x)p(y)
H(X) =−
∑
x∈a dom(X)
p(x)log(p(x))
The Uncertainty Coefficient is the normalized form of Mutual Information. It
gives information about how much the values of an attribute depend on another
attribute. We use it to determine what attributes are related to each other and
how much they relate to each other. The measure ranges from 0 (no correlation
between the two attributes) to 1 (completely correlated attributes, thus indi-
cating the existence of a Functional Dependency) [16]. If U(X|Y ) > threshold,
we will assume that the FD Y → X holds. This threshold has to be chosen
according to the amount of noise in the data. A higher threshold means a more
strict Functional Dependency is used that is less able to cope with noise.
Example 6. When we calculate the Uncertainty Coefficient of UserID1 and UserID0
we get: U(UserID1 |UserID0 ) = I(UserID1 ;UserID0 )H(UserID1 ) = 0.55971.1369 = 0.4923
For an attribute A in log L, new value(A), new relation(A) and violation(X,Y )
are defined as follows:
new value(A) :
|a dom(A)|
| L | , new relation(A) :
|a dom(Parents(A))|
| L |
violation(X,Y ) :
|{e ∈ L : FDX→Y (e.X) 6= e.Y }|
|L|
Example 7. The New Value Rate of the UserRole is equal to 315 = 0.2. The rate
for Activity is equal to 615 = 0.4. This indicates that new values are more likely
to occur for the attribute Activity than for UserRole according to our data.
With a standard Bayesian Network learning algorithm we can discover the
Conditional Dependencies present in the data. It is possible to use any learning
algorithm that uses data to learn its structure. We choose to use a Greedy
algorithm that finds a local optimum for the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)
[17].
The relations present in our model should only indicate a causality relation;
events in the present cannot influence events in the past. Therefore edges that
do not represent a causality relation are blacklisted. This blacklist is created by
adding all edges that do not end in the current time step.
We do not want the algorithm to find edges already labeled as FDs, therefor
we add these edges to a whitelist. The Bayesian Net learning algorithm should
always include the edges from the whitelist in the model. This way the learning
algorithm takes advantage of the information we already know about these FDs.
After running the greedy algorithm we have found the Conditional and Func-
tional Dependencies that define the structures present in our data. We can then
combine them into one single model. This gives us the structure of the eDBN-
model. The next step in building the model is filling in all the different Condi-
tional Probability Tables (CPTs) and constructing the Functional Dependency
functions for all nodes.
5 Experiments
To properly test our newly proposed method we use two different datasets. The
first dataset is a synthetically generated multi-dimensional dataset. The second
is the BPI Challenge 2015 (BPIC15) [18] data. This data consists of applications
for building permits in 5 Dutch municipalities, we refer to these as BPIC1 to
BPIC5, Table 3 summarizes the data. We use this last dataset in two different
forms: the dataset with anomalies introduced and the dataset with a reduced
subset of attributes with anomalies included. We included the same amount of
anomalies using a similar approach as described by Bohmer et al. [10] to best
compare our approach.
We use the synthetic dataset to test the overall performance of our algorithm,
where we try different ratios of anomalies in both training and test set. Next
we perform an in-depth comparison with the Likelihood Graphs proposed by
Bohmer et al. [10] using the reduced subset of the BPIC15 data. Furthermore
we compare our approach to a variety of algorithms available in the ELKI - tool
[19], using both the synthetic data and the reduced BPIC15 data. The ELKI
- tool contains most of the existing anomaly detection algorithms in a uniform
way. The Area Under the Curve (AUC) is used to compare the algorithms. All
code used to perform the experiments and generate the datasets can be found
on our GitHub repository1.
5.1 Testing with synthetic data
We built a data generation tool that allows us to create log files containing
different relations between events. In order to do so we first create a model of
sequential activities with depending attributes. The model is based on a BP for
shipping goods. Goods can have a value and an extra insurance can be taken.
Goods with an extra insurance need a different workflow from goods without
extra insurance. The data consists of 13 attributes. We create one model for
normal execution and one model for anomalous execution, where we explicitly
changed the order of events or use the wrong flow of events according to the
insurance chosen. Next we introduce some extra attributes where some of these
attributes depend on other attributes. For the anomalous traces we added ran-
dom values on random places. We generated multiple set-ups with a variable
number of anomalies in both training and test data. We added anomalies in our
training data to check and show that our approach does not require a flawless
log file as training data but is able to deal with a small amount of unexpected
behavior in the data.
The AUC-scores for different amounts of anomalies in both training and test
data can be found in Table 4. This test shows that our algorithm is able to find
the relations mentioned in Section 3, even when the training set contains a small
amount of noise or anomalies.
1 https://github.com/StephenPauwels/edbn
Dataset Number of traces Average trace length Number of Activities
BPIC1 1199 43.5 398
BPIC2 832 53.3 410
BPIC3 1409 42.3 383
BPIC4 1053 44.9 359
BPIC5 1156 51.0 389
Table 3: Description of the BPIC datasets
Test set
% Anomalies 0.1 0.5 1.0 2.5 5.0 10.0 25.0 50.0
Training set
0.0 1.00 0.99 0.98 1.00 0.93 0.98 0.99 0.97
0.5 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.96
1.0 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.98 1.00 0.98 0.97
2.5 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.89 0.96
Table 4: AUC values for different combinations of anomalies.
File Training size Test size Number of anomalies in Test set
BPIC1 589 610 291 (47.7%)
BPIC2 408 423 214 (50.5%)
BPIC3 723 686 356 (51.8%)
BPIC4 522 530 257 (48.4%)
BPIC5 595 561 283 (50.4%)
Table 5: Number of traces present in the different log files.
5.2 Comparison
Comparison with Likelihood Graphs In order to compare our approach to
the solution presented by Bohmer et al. we first implemented the algorithm found
in [10]. Next we generated data as described by Bohmer et al. starting from the
reduced BPIC data. Therefor we randomly split the original data in two equal
data sets, one for training and one for testing. In the test data we introduced
anomalies according to the description in Bohmer et al. The statistics for the
generated files can be found in Table 5. Normal input will, however, never contain
this many anomalies.
The Likelihood graph calculates the likelihood for the ongoing trace and
compares this with a baseline score in order to indicate if a trace is an anomaly.
Since our method works with giving scores and sorting all anomalies, we used the
minimum of the difference between the Ongoing Likelihood and the Minimum
Likelihood for the different activities within a trace in order to best capture the
ideas of the Likelihood Graphs. The lower the difference the more likely it is that
this trace contains an anomaly. We used the precision/recall curve to compare
the two approaches. The results can be found in the graphs in Figure 2 for each
of the five different municipalities. Since all five municipalities have different
ways of performing the different processes we also created one file containing all
data of all municipalities. Then we introduced anomalies in the same way as we
did for the other files. This combined dataset allows us to test how well each
approach can handle different processes in a single log file.
We can see that the two methods mostly perform equally on the BPIC2015
data. When we look at the results for the combined log file, we can see that we
clearly outperform the Likelihood Graph. We can conclude that our model is
capable of performing well especially with multiple processes in the log file.
(a) BPIC1 (b) BPIC2 (c) BPIC3
(d) BPIC4 (e) BPIC5 (f) Total BPIC
Fig. 2: Comparison of precision/recall graphs.
Comparison with other anomaly detection methods We also tested our
method against other anomaly detection methods (not necessarily methods that
take into account the sequential nature). We used the k-context format as input
for all the algorithms. The best parameters were chosen after performing some
experiments. We performed the experiments using the ELKI - tool [19]. Since
none of these methods uses a different (clean) training dataset we used the same
file to generate our model as to test the model. The results can be seen in Table
6. We see that only ALOCI outperforms us on the BPIC data, this is due to the
fact that we used the same file for training and testing. Our method and Bohmer
et al. performs best when having a clear training dataset. For some algorithms
we were not able to get results for both datasets (due to runtimes and memory
usage).
6 Conclusion
In this paper we extended Dynamic Bayesian Networks in order to create a
new model that allows us to better and in more detail describe the structure
and properties of a log file generated by process-aware information systems.
As standard DBNs have shortcomings for analyzing these logs we added some
elements to cope with these shortcomings. We added Functional Dependencies
for a better description of the structure of a log file. Since DBNs cannot cope
with unseen values we also improved the way our model deals with these unseen
values. Next we described our algorithm for creating models that reflect the
multidimensional and sequential nature of log files. We conducted different types
of experiments: the first experiment confirmed that our algorithm achieves high
AUC
Method Synth data BPIC data Remark
eDBN 1.00 0.84 no FDs were found for BPIC
eDBN without FD 0.69 0.84
Bohmer et al. [10] 1.00 0.58
FastABOD [20] 0.50 0.56
LOF [21] 0.49 0.55
SOD [22] 0.53 0.60
Feature Bagging [23] 0.75 0.57
SimpleCOP [24] 0.53 0.60
LibSVMOneClassOutlierDetection [25] 0.51 0.46
COP [26] 0.81 0.63
DWOF [27] 0.51 0.44
OpticSOF [28] 0.53 0.46
ALOCI [29] - 0.86
Bertens et al. [7] - - not able to get a complete run
Table 6: Overview of results for different Anomaly detection techniques.
performance in different settings with different amounts of anomalies in both
training and test sets. Next we compared our approach with existing solutions.
In the future we would like to extend our model in order to incorporate the time
aspect even better by introducing an extra timing element that is capable of
dealing with duration of activities and time gaps between activities.
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